The Impact of Sec Ruling on the Stock Returns: the Case of Oil and Gas Companies by Suwardjono, S. (Suwardjono)
Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Indonesia 
Vol. 17, No. 3, 2002,  323 - 337 
 
 
THE IMPACT OF SEC RULING ON THE STOCK RETURNS: 
THE CASE OF OIL AND GAS COMPANIES 
Suwardjono
*
 
Universitas Gadjah Mada 
ABSTRAK 
Studi-studi peristiwa (event studies) dalam bidang akuntansi menuntut identifikasi 
peristiwa yang berkaitan langsung dengan masalah akuntansi. Studi peristiwa tidak 
sekadar mengambil peristiwa yang monumental atau sensasional dan mengukur 
pengaruhnya terhadap reaksi pasar modal. Penelitian ini mengidentifikasi peristiwa yang 
erat kaitannya dengan standar akuntansi yang menyangkut pemilihan metoda akuntansi. 
Metoda kos penuh atau full cost (FC) dan metoda usaha sukses atau successful efforts (SE) 
menjadi fokus penelitian ini.  
     Penelitian ini menguji apakah peristiwa penolakan pemberlakuan kembali standar 
akuntansi yang telah lama ditunda penerapannya ditanggapi secara berbeda oleh investor 
perusahaan FC dan SE. Penelitian ini menjawab teori tentang pengaruh balik (reversal 
effect) dari peristiwa yang sebelumnya ditanggapi pasar secara negatif. Secara khusus, 
penelitian ini menguji hipotesis apakah investor untuk perusahaan FC menanggapi secara 
lebih positif terhadap keputusan penolakan pemberlakuan kembali SFAC No. 19 dibanding 
investor untuk perusahaan SE. 
     Reaksi pasar diukur atas dasar return abnormal dan return abnormal kumulatif. 
Pengujian dengan basis return abnormal tidak mendukung hipotesis sedangkan pengujian 
berbasis return abnormal kumulatif mendukung hipotesis. Hal ini menunjukkan bahwa, 
dalam jendela peristiwa tertentu, return abnormal kumulatif mungkin lebih banyak 
mengandung informasi dalam perioda return abnormal. 
Kata kunci: return abnormal, return abnormal kumulatif, kos penuh,  minyak dan gas 
bumi, standar akuntansi, studi peristiwa, usaha sukses. 
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BACKGROUND ISSUE 
On July 18, 1977, Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) released Exposure 
Draft which required companies using full cost 
method to switch to successful efforts method. 
Under full cost (FC) method, all exploratory 
costs are capitalized and amortized over the 
discovered reserves on a pro rata basis. Under 
the successful efforts (SE) method, on the other 
hand, only prediscovery costs that can be 
directly related to revenue producing wells are 
capitalized and the rest are expensed. 
Following the release of the exposure draft, on 
December 5, 1977 FASB affirmed the proposal 
by issuing Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standard (SFAS) No. 19. Because of political 
pressure from a group of oil and gas companies 
which felt that they would be injured by the 
Statement, Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) overruled the standard 
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through Accounting Standard Rulings (ASR) 
253 in August 1978. Since the release of the 
exposure draft, debate over the accounting 
method has generated tremendous conflicts 
among accountants, oil companies, and 
regulators. 
Since the overruling of the SFAS No. 19, 
the SEC has been silent on the issue for almost 
six years and the industry has been anxious 
about the uncertainty about the final decision. 
The issue was reopened in September 1986 
when the SEC's accounting staff was recom-
mending a mandatory accounting change as 
prescribed by FASB. The issue was raised in 
relation to the sharp drop in energy prices that 
greatly affected the financial statements of 
small oil and gas companies (Wall Street 
Journal, October 23, 1986). In the SEC 
meeting October 30, 1986, the SEC rejected 
the proposal to make the FASB No. 19 
effective. The 4-1 vote against the accounting 
staff's proposal was announced in Wall Street 
Journal October 31, 1986.  
FC adopters were certainly the group that 
would be greatly affected by the standard when 
it was issued. Therefore, they contended the 
mandatory change which would cause many of 
them to restate financial results and write down 
stockholder equity. This could force some 
companies into technical breach of debt 
contract or unfavorable credit rating. Basically, 
the main argument of FC firms against the 
SFAS No. 19 was that the switch to SE method 
would substantially depress reported earnings 
and significantly increase the volatility of 
earnings over time (as compared with the 
smoother earnings series resulting from the FC 
method). On the average, FC adopters are 
medium-sized companies and some argue that 
the mandatory change would also seriously 
inhibit the ability of those companies to raise 
capital in the stock and money markets and this 
would result in new exploration cutbacks and 
unfavorable competitiveness. Some studies 
even indicated that the threat of the accounting 
change was depressing stock prices (see for 
example Lev, 1979 and Collins and Dent, 
1979). The economic consequence and the 
opposition to the SFAS No. 19 suggest that the 
regulation was considered as a bad news for 
most FC firms and therefore the announcement 
of the standard had an unfavorable impact on 
the stock price. Also, FC firms have been 
facing uncertainty regarding the choice of 
accounting method for more than six years 
since the overruling of the standard. With the 
SEC's decision to reject the enforcement of the 
accounting change, on October 30, 1986, the 
SEC somewhat removed the uncertainty about 
the rules. If the decision had been perceived as 
a victory (good news) for many full cost 
adopters, the public announcement of the 
decision may have some reversal or positive 
impact on the stock market especially for FC 
adopters. The issue is whether the market for 
oil and gas stocks reacts differently to the SEC 
decision to reject the reenactment of the SFAS 
No. 19. 
This paper examines the reaction of stock 
prices to the SEC announcement. In particular, 
the paper analyzes the behavior of stock prices 
during the announcement period and provides 
some evidence if the accounting regulation 
announcement results in abnormal (positive) 
returns for the affected firms (full cost 
companies).  
This paper is an event study. Unlike studies 
that merely measure the impact of any political 
or global events on the stock market in general 
(for example, Suryawijaya and Setiawan, 1998 
and Gunawan, 2001), this paper focuses on an 
event that directly affect accounting choice 
issue in a particular industry. Thus, the issue in 
this paper is relevant to accounting and thus 
this paper provides some incremental 
contribution in a meaningful way to the current 
accounting knowledge-base. 
LITERATURE REVIEW  
The debate about the merits and 
consequences of the accounting change for 
exploration costs has also invoked acade-
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micians to conduct economic, financial and 
accounting studies devoted to the issues. In the 
area of accounting choice issues, Lilien and 
Pastena (1982) examine the determinants of 
intramethod choice and find that the economic 
incentives influence the choice between FC and 
SE methods. DeAngelo (1982) provides 
evidence that oil and gas companies whose 
financial statements were adversely affected by 
SFAS No. 19 increased the rate at which they 
changed auditors during the FC/SE 
controversy. Lys (1984) investigates whether 
debt covenants are related to changes in firm 
value occurring with mandated accounting 
changes in the case of oil and gas accounting. 
The general conclusion from these studies is 
that there are differences in the characteristics 
and environments between the FC and SE 
companies. Therefore, given alternative 
methods available (FC and SE are the two 
major methods), a company will select a 
method that best suits to the firm 
characteristics and objectives. Mandatory 
change of accounting method will certainly 
have economic impact on the firms affected 
(FC users).     
In the area of stock price impact, Collins 
and Dent (1979) find that the shares of oil and 
gas producing firms using the FC method 
suffered significant negative abnormal market 
return subsequent to the release of SFAS No. 
19 Exposure Draft. This suggests that the pro-
posed elimination of FC accounting had a 
negative impact on the equity securities of the 
FC firms. The impact is due to the anticipated 
consequences that the change is likely to have 
on managerial behavior and costs. Using 
weekly return data as Collins and Dent, 
Dyckman and Smith (1979) investigate the 
impact of the mandatory change in the 
accounting method on the common share 
valuation of FC firms relative to SE firms. 
Their results fail to support the hypothesis that 
the release of SFAS No. 19 Exposure Draft 
adversely affected the distributions of returns 
of FC securities.  
Unlike the studies by Collins and Dent and 
by Dyckman and Smith which use weekly data, 
Lev (1979) examines whether the accounting 
change would adversely affect the stock price 
equilibrium using daily return data. He argues 
that daily observations will allow a more 
refined analysis of the relationship between 
stock price behavior and accounting regulation 
releases. He further argues that the sample 
selection, statistical techniques, and long event 
window in the previous studies might have 
caused the conflicting results. The results of his 
study indicate that the release of the FASB 
Exposure Draft was associated with a 
downward revision of stock prices of oil and 
gas producers, particularly those using the FC 
method. His sample was restricted to New 
York and American Stock Exchange firms. 
Following Lev's methodology, this paper 
examines the stock price behavior of full cost 
firms using market model and daily return data. 
However, different from previous studies 
which focus on negative impact of mandatory 
change threat, this paper focuses on the 
positive or reversal impact of mandatory 
change abolishment.  
Lev (1979) uses only NYSE and AMEX 
firms. The reason for exclusion of OTC firms 
in Lev's study was the concerns about potential 
non-synchronous trading problem (which may 
cause misspecification of market model) and 
efficiency of the OTC market. In their experi-
mental study, however, Brown and Warner 
(1985) conclude that the failure to take into 
account non-synchronous trading in estimating 
market model does not result in misspecifica-
tion of event study methodology using OLS 
market model. To address this issue, this paper 
will take into consideration the inclusion and 
exclusion of the OTC firms. The reason to 
make such an analysis is that it is possible to 
select OTC firms with nonmissing date or 
return values from the current data. Moreover, 
with respect to OTC market efficiency, the 
event studies are generally concerned with 
unexpected return so that market efficiency is 
assumed up to a certain level. As Brown and 
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Warner (1980) point out, event studies provide 
a direct test of market efficiency and the 
magnitude of abnormal performance in an 
event window period.  
HYPOTHESIS 
Since the SEC decision is deemed as a 
good news for FC companies, it is expected 
that investors for FC firms will favorably react 
to the SEC rejection announcement. The 
positive reaction is heightened by the fact that 
the uncertainty of whether the mandatory 
change would be made effective had been 
continuing for an extended period of time. 
Therefore, the public announcement of the 
decision may have some reversal impact on the 
stock prices of FC companies. On the other 
hand, investors for SE firms would be 
indifferent to the announcement. Thus, the 
following alternative hypothesis is proposed: 
Investors for FC firms will react more 
favorably to the SEC rejection decision 
with regard to the re-enactment of SFAC 
No. 19 than will investors for SE firms. 
 
Statistically, the hypothesis can be stated in 
terms of abnormal returns or cumulative 
abnormal returns. That is the mean abnormal 
returns during each announcement period is 
positive for FC firms and the abnormal returns 
have different distribution from that of SE 
firms.  
RESEARCH METHOD 
The impact of SEC decision on stock 
market is measured in terms of abnormal 
returns during the announcement period. To 
measure abnormal returns, the following 
standard market model is to be estimated:  
jtmtjjjt RR   
where Rjt is return of company j at day t and 
Rmt is return of the market at day t. This model 
is widely used in event studies (e.g. Lev, 1979; 
Dyckman and Smith, 1979). The idea underly-
ing the market model is that events are 
classified into two categories: those which 
affect all securities in the market (reflected in 
the market return) and those which affect only 
specific securities (reflected in the residuals). 
Another reason to use this model is the 
robustness of the model as suggested by Ball 
and Brown (1980). In their study of security 
price performance, they conclude that beyond a 
simple market model there is no evidence that 
more complicated methodologies convey any 
benefit. 
Following the method used by Brown and 
Warner (1985) in their experimental design 
with market model residuals, the model is 
estimated by ordinary least square (OLS) 
regression over pre-announcement period of 
229 days (-239 through -11). The results of the 
estimation are used to predict the value of 
expected returns during the announcement 
period. Abnormal return for a particular day 
for each firm in the estimation period (EP) or 
announcement period (AP) can be calculated 
as: 
)ˆˆ( mtjjjtjt RRAR   
The comparison of difference in reaction 
between FC and SE firms is performed by 
comparing the behavior of cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) during the announ-
cement period. CARs for individual firms are 
defined as follows: 




AD
ADw
jjw ARCAR  
where CARjw is the cumulative abnormal 
returns for company j for event window w 
which span several days before and after 
announcement date (AD). To analyze the 
sensitivity of results to unobserved extraneous 
factors, several event windows will be 
examined. Since the interest in this paper is the 
impact on particular industry or group of 
companies, all analyses are performed in the 
portfolio level. A week before the announ-
cement of SEC decision on October 31, 1986, 
Wall Street Journal (October 23, 1986) 
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reported the SEC meeting plan to discuss the 
matter. Since two consecutive events occurred 
within a short period, the overall impact will be 
investigated within 21 days of announcement 
period from day -10 through day +10. 
However, to examine the effects of the 
announcement on shorter event window, 
analyses will also be performed for 
announcement periods of -5 through +10, -5 
through +5, -1 through +1, and day zero. 
Normally, the impact of such an announcement 
like SEC decision announcement in The Wall 
Street Journal does not last very long (but only 
a few days) because of capital efficiency. 
Therefore, this paper evaluates the impact of 
the announcement only up to 10 days. 
Unlike Lev's method that uses log values of 
security and market returns, this paper uses the 
original values to estimate the market model. 
This paper also uses longer period of estima-
tion (229 days instead of 45 days used by Lev) 
to average out the impact of all events that 
affect all securities in the market before the 
announcement period. 
Statistical tests 
Since SE firms are not expected to be 
affected by the announcement, they will be 
used as a comparison or control group with 
respect to the behavior of abnormal returns 
around the announcement date. The first test is 
to examine whether there was a reaction of 
both groups to the SEC decision. If regulation 
announcement had contained information 
(good news), the group affected by the 
regulation (FC firms) should have a positive 
mean abnormal returns in the announcement 
period. To test the statistical significance of the 
mean abnormal return, crude dependence 
adjustment t-test used by Brown and Warner 
(1980) is employed. The general formula of the 
test statistic is given below: 
2
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where 
AP = Announcement  period  of  interest 
(-10/+10, -5/+5, -5/+10, -1/+1, and 
0). 
BAP = Beginning of announcement period. 
EAP = End of announcement period. 
EP = Estimation period (229 days in this 
study). 
BEP = Beginning   of  estimation   period 
(-229 minus number of days before 
the announcement date depending 
on the length of event window to be 
tested). 
EEP = End of estimation period (number 
of days before the announcement 
date depending on the length of 
event window to be tested). 
J = Number of firms in each group (FC 
or SE firms). 
AR = Abnormal returns for individual 
firms for each days within the event 
window. 
 
Basically, the numerator in the above 
equation reflects the mean of each firm’s mean 
abnormal returns during the announcement 
period for all firms in FC or SE group 
(portfolio or cross-sectional mean). The 
denominator in the equation, likewise, is the 
standard deviation of sampling distribution of 
the portfolio means. 
The second test is to evaluate whether the 
two groups react differently with respect to the 
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SEC announcement. Two approaches will be 
performed. One approach is to compare the 
portfolio mean difference of abnormal returns 
using the t-test and another is to compare the 
portfolio mean difference of cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR). In the second 
approach, the null hypothesis is that the mean 
CARs of both groups are the same. To evaluate 
the sensitivity of results to violation of 
normality assumption, sign test and Wilcoxon 
rank sum test will also be performed. Also, to 
examine the effect of market liquidity, analyses 
are made to firms both listed in major and 
over-the-counter (OTC) market. A graphical 
analyses will be performed as a preliminary 
evaluation of the market reaction. 
Sample Selection and Data 
Daily returns and market data are extracted 
from CRSP 1990 daily and 1992 OTC daily 
tapes. The CUSIP numbers of sample firms 
listed by Malmquist (1990) are used to extract 
the data from CRSP data files. The reason to 
use Malmquist's list is that the list identifies 
accounting method (FC or SE) adopted by each 
firms. There are 316 in the list. Of the 
companies in the list, 197 are full cost adopters 
and 119 are successful efforts adopters. Since 
the list was made for 1985 company data, it is 
assumed that no company in the list had 
switched accounting method in 1986. 
To enter into the sample in this paper, a 
company should be listed in major exchanges 
or OTC market. A company should also have 
daily returns and market returns for all 250 
trading days from 239 days before the event 
date (October 31, 1986) to 10 days after the 
event date. A company with a missing value in 
any single day (even if only in the estimation 
period) is eliminated from the sample. This 
selection process results in a sample of 204 
companies which consist of 126 FC adopters 
and 78 SE adopters. Out of the FC group, 82 
firms are from major exchanges and out of SE 
group, 44 firms are from major exchanges. 
Table 1 presents the summary description of 
the sample. 
Table 1. Summary of Firms in the Sample 
 
Market/Method FC SE Total 
 NYSE/AMEX 
 OTC 
 82 
 44 
44 
34 
126 
  78 
 Total 126 78 204 
 
The fact that old data were used in this 
paper does not mean that this study is obsolete. 
This is an event study that involves an event in 
the past to empirically test an accounting the-
ory that explains and predicts accounting 
practice. A valid theory should be able to 
predict the phenomena that occurred in the past 
regardless of how old the historical data are. 
This nature of theory is described by Watts and 
Zimmerman (1986) as follows: 
Prediction of accounting practice means 
that the theory predicts unobserved 
accounting phenomena. Unobserved 
phenomena are not necessarily future 
phenomena; they include phenomena that 
have occurred but on which systematic 
evidence has not been collected. For 
example, an accounting theory can provide 
hypotheses about the attributes of firms that 
use LIFO versus the attributes of firms 
using FIFO. Such predictions can be tested 
using historical data on the attributes of 
firms using the two methods (p. 2). 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The abnormal and cumulative returns are 
plotted in several figures for both the FC and 
SE groups to get the overall picture of the 
impact of SEC decision. Figure 1 suggests that 
both groups undergo fluctuation in abnormal 
returns. FC returns fluctuate somewhat more 
widely than SE returns before the 
announcement date. On the announcement 
date, the FC firms undergo a marked positive 
return relative to SE firms. This price increase 
of FC stock can be attributed to the SEC 
decision. After the announcement date, the FC 
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abnormal returns tend to be positive while 
those of SE firms tend to fluctuate evenly 
around zero line. These suggest that the FC 
firms react differently from SE firms to the 
regulation change. While the abnormal returns 
graph of FC firms turns downward sharply on 
day -5 to -4, the abnormal returns graph of SE 
firms turns upward between days -5 and -3. 
The sharp decrease in stock price of FC firms 
is possibly associated with the fact that one 
week before the announcement date, the 
mandatory change was proposed to be made 
effective. This incident is the same as time 
when the FASB released the exposure draft in 
1977. Therefore, consistent with the previous 
findings about the impact of regulation 
announcement (Lev, 1979 and Collins and 
Dent, 1979), it is expected that FC firms stock 
price would be depressed on that day. 
However, because of prolonged uncertainty 
since the first announcement of the accounting 
change, the impact of proposal announcement 
in The Wall Street Journal may not be as 
strong as that of the first-time release. 
Figure 1  Daily Abnormal Returns During Announcement Period 
 
The difference reaction of the announ-
cement impact is also indicated in the 
cumulative abnormal returns plot in Figure 2. 
On the average, FC firms tend to react 
positively to the SEC decision while SE firms 
tend to react negatively. One possible reason 
for the negative reaction of the SE firms is that 
the proposal by the accounting staff of the SEC 
imposed more stringent requirements for SE 
firms as pointed out by Lev (1979). Another 
possible reason is that with the abolishment of 
the proposal, SE firms may become less 
competitive in terms of exploration activities 
because FC firms will be expected to be more 
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aggressive. However, whether the negative 
reaction is true or just a matter of chance is 
subject to significance test discussed later. A 
further look at the graphs on Figure 2 shows 
that before the announcement date, the CAR of 
FC firms are not well behaved and no trend is 
observed but then after the announcement date 
there is a slight upward trend. SE firms graph 
shows a slight downward trend but the trend 
levels off after the announcement date. The 
best that can be said from the analysis is that 
both groups react differently.  
Figure 2  Daily Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for -10 to +10 Announcement Period 
 
Lev (1979) argues that OTC market is less 
efficient than the major exchange because of a 
lower volume of trading and less frequent 
trading days. Moreover, the trading system of 
OTC is different from that of major exchange. 
In that situation, the relationship between OTC 
stocks and market returns is non-synchronous 
which potentially leads to misspecified market 
model. Therefore, Lev did not include OTC 
firms in his sample. This argument suggests 
that OTC market will react differently from 
major market to the SEC decision and 
therefore combining both firms in event studies 
may result in unreliable conclusions. To 
examine the validity of this argument with 
respect to the issue in this paper, the OTC 
firms are taken out from the sample and 
analyzed as a separate group in each FC or SE 
firms.  
It can be seen from Figure 3 that before -2 
of the announcement date, FC firms in OTC 
market are not different from FC firms in major 
market with respect to their reaction to the 
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mandatory accounting change. After that, both 
markets appear to show somewhat different 
reactions. In particular, during -1 through +1 
announcement period, major market reacts in 
opposite direction to the OTC market. After 
day +1, the OTC market abnormal returns tend 
to fluctuate more sharply than the major 
market, even though no consistent direction is 
noticeable. The differences in the reaction may 
suggest that the OTC market is slower in cap-
turing the public information and hence less 
efficient. This is consistent with what was sus-
pected by Lev (1979). Combining the two 
market may results in underestimation of the 
true abnormal returns of FC firms. Again, the 
true impact of this understatement is subject to 
a statistical significance test discussed later in 
this section. Since it is expected that SE firms 
do not react in a meaningful way to the SEC 
decision, any specific pattern of abnormal 
returns in SE firms in both major market and in 
OTC market is not expected. This is evident 
from the graphs in Figure 4. Abnormal returns 
from both markets fluctuate almost evenly 
around zero line. Nevertheless, from CAR 
graph in Figure 5, it is apparent that SE firms 
investors from OTC market react more 
negatively than that from major market. No 
trend in CAR is observed in the major market 
while negative trend is noticeable in the CAR 
of OTC market. Consistent with Lev's 
argument, combining both market in the event 
studies may likewise cause understatement of 
average cumulative abnormal return.  
 
 
Figure 3  Daily Abnormal Returns of FC Firms: Major Exchange and OTC 
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Figure 4  Daily Abnormal Returns of SE Firms: Major Exchange and OTC 
 
Significance Tests 
Previous discussion provides some 
preliminary indication that there are differences 
in the impact of accounting regulation 
announcement between FC firms and SE firms. 
In particular, the SEC decision to reject the 
proposal to put mandatory switch to SE method 
into effect has a positive impact on the stock 
price of FC firms and a negative impact on the 
stock price of SE firms. Furthermore, the OTC 
market appears to be less efficient than the 
major market and thereby inclusion of the OTC 
firms in the sample could result in 
understatement of abnormal returns. To 
support the validity of the graphical 
interpretation, the crude dependence adjust-
ment t-tests are performed to examine if the 
differential effects are statistically significant. 
Table 2 summarizes the results of significance 
tests of mean abnormal returns (MARs) for 
various event window periods in each type of 
firms and market. 
Table 2 indicates that almost all test 
statistics in long (-10 through +10) to narrow (-
1 through +1) announcement periods are not 
statistically significant even at an optimistic 
level of ten percent (equivalent to t = 1.60). 
This statistically insignificant test statistics are 
shown for FC and SE firms alike. In general, 
therefore, the test results on the basis of mean 
abnormal returns do not support the hypothesis 
that there is a real impact of SEC decision to 
the stock price of oil and gas industry. In 
particular, the SEC decision did not have a 
positive stock price impact on FC firms (as 
hypothesized) nor a negative impact on SE 
firms. 
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Figure 5  Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns: Major Exchange and OTC 
 
 Table 2  Summary of Mean Portfolio Abnormal Returns and Significance Test Results 
 
 Event Window FC-All SE-All FC-NY/AM SE-NY/AM FC-OTC SE-OTC 
 MAR (-10/+10) 
 t-statistic 
 
 MAR (-5/+5) 
 t-statistic 
 
 MAR (-5/+10) 
 t-statistic 
 
 MAR (-1/+1) 
 t-statistic 
 
 MAR (0) 
 t-statistic 
0.0023020 
(0.2832) 
 
0.0018788 
(0.2312) 
 
0.0019896 
(0.2448) 
 
0.0040424 
(0.4974) 
 
0.0130170 
(1.6016) 
0.0007793 
(0.1023) 
 
0.0003335 
(0.0438) 
 
0.0000385 
(0.0051) 
 
0.0026128 
(0.3429) 
 
0.0064755 
(0.8499) 
0.0029408 
(0.2906) 
 
0.0022568 
(0.2230) 
 
0.0027965 
(0.2763) 
 
0.0058230 
(0.5753) 
 
0.0215260 
(2.1268) 
0.0003740 
(0.0467) 
 
0.0013474 
(0.1684) 
 
0.0011153 
(0.1394) 
 
0.0059769 
(0.7469) 
 
0.0076660 
(0.9580) 
0.0011114 
(0.1315) 
 
0.0011743 
(0.1389) 
 
0.0004857 
(0.0575) 
 
0.0007239 
(0.0856) 
 
0.0028396 
(0.3359) 
0.0022718 
(0.2182) 
 
0.0025088 
(0.2410) 
 
0.0015318 
(0.1472) 
 
0.0017407 
(0.1672) 
 
0.0049348 
(0.4741) 
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Nevertheless, the results show that the 
narrower the event window, the higher the t 
statistics. This provides the notion that the 
shorter the window the higher the probability 
to reject the hypothesis of no impact. The t-
statistics for FC firms from major market 
(NYSE/ AMEX) are relatively much higher 
than those of FC firms from OTC market for 
all event windows. This suggest that FC stocks 
in the major exchange are more reactive than 
FC stocks in the OTC market. Therefore, 
combining them in the sample would result in 
less power of test as shown by relatively lower 
t-statistics in combined FC firms than the FC 
firms from major exchange alone. In spite of 
the statistically insignificant results, this 
supports the argument for not including OTC 
firms in the event studies examining the impact 
of accounting regulations as suggested by Lev.  
On the announcement date, the test statistic 
is statistically significant for FC firms in 
NY/AM market at 0.02 level. The same result 
occurs for FC firms in combined market at 
least at 0.10 level. However, the impact of an 
event on stock price cannot be evaluated only 
in one day because very highly efficient market 
should be assumed. This assumption is 
unrealistic because investors actually have 
different ability and speed to capture 
information signals and to act upon them. As 
previously mentioned, event studies in most 
cases define announcement period to span 
more than one day and in several cases even 
one year. 
 
Table 3  Summary of Univariate T-statistics for Mean CARs Over 21 Days Window 
 
Market 
Types of test 
NYSE/AMEX OTC Combined 
FC SE FC SE FC SE 
 T-test: Mean=0 
   Prob > |T| 
 
 M-test: Sign=0 
   Prob > |M| 
 
 S-test: Rsum=0 
   Prob > |S|  
   9.22608 
(0.001) 
 
10.5 
(0.001) 
 
115.5 
(0.001) 
-1.14390 
(0.266) 
 
-2.5 
(0.383) 
 
-31.5 
(0.284) 
20.01842 
(0.001) 
 
10.5 
(0.001) 
 
115.5 
(0.001) 
-8.93191 
(0.001) 
 
-10.5 
(0.001) 
 
-115.5 
(0.001) 
11.78248 
(0.001) 
 
10.5 
(0.001) 
 
115.5 
(0.001) 
-11.11520 
(0.001) 
 
-10.5 
(0.001) 
 
-115.5 
(0.001) 
 
 
Table 3 summarizes the univariate t-test for 
mean CARs equal zero for each group of firms 
in NYSE/AMEX, OTC, and combined 
markets. Mean CARs for each group of firms 
in all market are statistically significant at 0.05 
level except for SE firms in NYSE/AMEX 
market. This means that, except for SE firms in 
major exchanges, the mean CAR for each 
group is not equal to zero. Therefore, in terms 
of CARs, the announcement of SEC has an 
impact on the stock market. When SE firms 
from OTC are taken out from the sample, there 
is a statistically significant difference in mean 
CARs between SE firms from major exchanges 
and SE firms from OTC market. Therefore, 
combining them may result in misleading 
conclusions. This evidence supports the 
argument for not including OTC firms in the 
event studies as suggested by Lev (1979). 
Whether the mean CARs for each group of 
firms are positive or negative or whether mean 
CAR for one group is greater than that of other 
cannot be determined from the above table. 
Table 4 presents the results of comparison test 
between the two groups in all types of market 
for -10/+10 event window. Comparisons for 
other event windows (not shown) are also 
performed and these comparisons provide 
similar results. 
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Table 4  Test Results for the Difference in Mean CARs Between the Two Groups 
   NYSE/AMEX OTC Combined 
   TTEST:  
      T-statistic 
      p-value > |T| 
      One tail p-value 
 
   Wilcoxon Test: 
      Z-statistic 
      p-value > |z| 
      One tail p-value 
 
8.3071 
(0.0001) 
(0.00005) 
 
 
5.33302 
(0.0001) 
(0.00005) 
 
13.4270 
(0.0001) 
(0.00005) 
 
 
5.53426 
(0.0001) 
(0.00005) 
 
16.0611 
(0.0001) 
(0.00005) 
 
 
5.53426 
(0.0001) 
(0.00005) 
   
The t statistics in each type of market are 
all statistically significant at 0.05 level. There-
fore, it can be concluded that, on the basis of 
mean CARs, there is indeed a difference 
between FC firms and SE firms with respect to 
the impact of SEC announcement on the stock 
prices. The sign test in Table 3 and the 
Wilcoxon test results suggest that mean CARs 
for FC firm are positive and the mean CARs 
for SE firms are negative. It can be concluded 
that the announcement of the SEC decision has 
a positive impact on the stock price of FC firms 
and a negative impact on the stock price of SE 
firms. For FC firms, the results are consistent 
with the expected reversal impact of the 
mandatory accounting change when it was first 
released. 
The test results based on the mean 
abnormal returns are inconsistent with those 
based on mean cumulative abnormal returns. 
The former does not support the hypothesis but 
the latter does. Averaging abnormal returns 
during announcement period in each individual 
firm may have a dampening effect on the 
measure of market reaction so that the power 
of test is reduced. Averaging not only draws 
the mean abnormal return to zero when returns 
fluctuate around zero but also hides the 
information of individual abnormal returns. 
This does not happen to cumulative abnormal 
returns. If abnormal returns tend to increase or 
decrease, cumulative abnormal returns will 
capture the tendency and thereby no 
information is lost in the CAR as an estimate. 
Therefore, cumulative abnormal returns may 
have richer information than mean abnormal 
returns and thus CAR-based statistical tests are 
more powerful. 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, AND 
LIMITATION 
This paper examines the impact of SEC 
decision to reject the proposal to make 
effective of SFAS No. 19 on the stock price of 
oil and gas industry especially of the 
companies adopting full cost method. The 
impact on stock price is measured in terms of 
mean abnormal return and cumulative 
abnormal returns during the period of decision 
announcement. Market model is employed to 
estimate abnormal returns for each individual 
company and for both FC and SE groups. 
Statistical tests using mean abnormal returns 
and mean cumulative abnormal return are 
performed to determine if the impact is 
statistically significant. 
The test results based on mean abnormal 
returns using crude dependence adjustment t- 
tests do not provide the evidence that mean 
abnormal returns for all possible event 
windows are not zero. Therefore, it is 
concluded that the SEC decision to reject the 
proposal did not have an impact on the stock 
price of oil and gas industry. Specifically, the 
announcement of SEC decision did not cause a 
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positive abnormal returns for FC firms. Given 
this is the case, one possible explanation for 
the insignificance of results is that the issue of 
elimination of full cost method has been going 
on quite long time since it was released in 
1977.   This prolonged uncertainty makes no 
surprise about the reopening of the issue and 
the decision of the SEC. In other word, the 
market has anticipated such an event or action 
and acted accordingly. The absence of 
unanticipated abnormal returns during the 
announcement period also suggests that the 
market is efficient with respect to such 
information. Another possible explanation is 
that averaging abnormal returns during 
announcement period results in an estimator 
that is less informative and thereby less 
powerful tests. Therefore, an alternative 
measure (that is cumulative abnormal returns) 
is also used to test the hypothesis. 
The alternative tests using cumulative 
abnormal returns indicate that the SEC 
decision announcement has a different impact 
on the market between FC firms and SE firms. 
In particular, the SEC decision to reject the re-
enactment of SFAS No. 19 was favorably 
responded by investors for FC firms and 
unfavorably responded by investors for SE 
firms. This difference in results suggests that 
the tests using mean CARs may be more 
powerful than the test using mean abnormal 
return. Subject to the validity of reaction 
measures, this study supports the contention 
that the choice of accounting method does have 
an economic consequence and thereby standard 
setting is indeed a political process. 
One limitation of this study is that only two 
groups in the same industry are compared. FC 
firms are treated as if they were an 
experimental group and SE firms a control 
group. Therefore, it cannot be assured whether 
the different reactions between the two groups 
are due to the SEC announcement or due to 
some other confounding factors. Future 
research of this nature should include a control 
group from different industry. 
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